Skip to content

Unrestricted administrative approval

The literal role name admin grants no permission. An explicitly assigned * remains the all-permissions grant for current and future platform permissions. Use concrete permissions for routine operators and reserve unrestricted access for controlled administration and independently accessible emergency recovery.

Protected operations

Creating or expanding a role to include *, enabling such a role, assigning it to a user, mapping it to a group, adding a member to that group, re-enabling an unrestricted user, or resetting that user's password requires all of the following:

  • An active, existing human user whose current persisted effective roles explicitly include *.
  • Actual human authentication within five minutes. A renewed cookie or refreshed token does not reset this interval.
  • Acknowledgement of unrestricted access. Existing role permission requests support acknowledgeWildcardGrant: true; other protected operations accept X-OIS-Administrative-Approval: acknowledge.
  • A durable approval-intent audit record before any mutation. Success is recorded separately after persistence.

Group role mappings support the existing role-name representation and the role IDs sent by Management Web. Groups cannot inject subject, issuer, audience, role, scope, permission, authentication-time, verification, persisted identity/profile fields (including phone number), or internal protocol claims. Previously stored reserved claim mappings are suppressed during new claim projection.

A machine credential cannot approve a human operation. A stale token carrying * cannot approve after its user's persisted unrestricted authority is removed. Ordinary concrete permission changes continue to use their existing endpoint permissions.

Operator workflow

Management Web requests acknowledgement for the pending operation. Cancellation sends no approved retry. When authentication is too old or its time is unknown, the dialog starts sign-in with prompt=login and max_age=0, returns to the operator's page, and requires the operator to repeat and review the operation. It does not automatically replay a mutation across sign-in.

Local password sign-in supplies the actual authentication event. Federation can supply freshness only from the upstream's validated auth_time claim. Receiving an SSO callback is insufficient; providers without trustworthy authentication time require an independent supported sign-in method for protected approval.

The API returns HTTP 403 Problem Details for approval failures, with an errorCode:

Suffix Operator action
HumanRequired Use a human administrative session.
AuthorityRequired Use an active human who currently holds the explicit all-permissions grant.
ReauthenticationRequired Sign in again through a method that establishes actual authentication time.
AcknowledgementRequired Review and explicitly acknowledge unrestricted access.

Authority is captured before the operation reads users, roles, or groups. Changes to these authority dependencies and the protected mutation share a database revision fence: concurrent changes reject the stale operation with HTTP 409 and roll back its mutation. Reload and review the operation before retrying; approval is never automatically replayed. Ordinary login timestamp updates do not invalidate this snapshot.

Codes have the prefix Forbidden.AdministrativeApproval.. The acknowledgement applies to one request; it does not establish authentication or authority.

Audit and rollout

Approval audit writes use an independent persistence scope so that logging cannot accidentally save pending role or group changes. AdministrativeApproval.IntentApproved is an approved intention, not proof of a completed grant. MutationSucceeded records successful persistence. MutationNotConfirmed means no successful completion was recorded; inspect the current state before retrying. Intent audit storage failure prevents approval. Outcome audit failure preserves the operation's result, emits a critical diagnostic without identities or exception details, and leaves the outcome pending for a request-end retry. If that retry also fails, reconcile the durable approved intent against persisted state; do not repeat the mutation merely to repair its audit trail.

Preserve a tested independently accessible emergency administrator before rollout. Initial bootstrap establishes explicit permissions through the controlled deployment process; routine seed reruns must not restore removed grants, activate disabled accounts, or manufacture verification evidence. This change does not create a bootstrap or recovery bypass.

The first release enforces the boundary decision from initial deployment. Development credentials issued before these restrictions are not production credentials. Downgrading to a version that infers authority from role names or permits ungoverned grants reopens those boundaries.